Introduction
* Since Bertrand's (1883) criticism of Cournot's (1838) work, economists have come to realize that solutions to oligopoly games depend critically on the strategic variables that firms are assumed to use. Consider, for example, the simple case of a duopoly where each firm produces at a constant cost b per unit and where the demand curve is linear, p = a -q. Cournot (quantity) competition yields equilibrium price p = (a + 2b)/3, while Bertrand (price) competition yields p = b.
In this article, we show by example that there is more to Bertrand competition than simply "competition over prices." It is easiest to explain what we mean by reviewing the stories associated with Cournot and Bertrand. The Cournot story concerns producers who simultaneously and independently make production quantity decisions, and who then bring what they have produced to the market, with the market price being the price that equates the total supply with demand. The Bertrand story, on the other hand, concerns producers who simultaneously and independently name prices. Demand is allocated to the low-price producer(s), who then produce (up to) the demand they encounter. Any unsatisfied demand goes to the second lowest price producer(s), and so on.
There are two differences in these stories: how price is determined (by an auctioneer in Cournot and by price "competition" in Bertrand) , and when production is supposed to take place. We demonstrate here that the Bertrand outcome requires both price competition and production after demand determination. Specifically, consider the following game between expected profit maximizing producers: In a first stage, producers decide independently and simultaneously how much they will produce, and this production takes place. They then bring these quantities to market, each learns how much the other produced, and they engage in Bertrand-like price competition: They simultaneously and independently name prices and demand is allocated in Bertrand fashion, with the proviso that one cannot satisfy more demand than one produced for in the first stage.
In this two-stage game, it is easy to produce one equilibrium. Let each firm choose the Cournot quantity. If each firm does so, each subsequently names the Cournot price. If, on the other hand, either chooses some quantity other than the Cournot quantity, its rival names price zero in the second stage. Since any defection in the first stage will result in one facing the demand residual from the Cournot quantity, and since the Cournot quantity is the best response to this residual demand function, this is clearly an equilibrium. What is somewhat more surprising is that (for the very special parameterization above and for a large class of other symmetric parameterizations) the Cournot outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome. Moreover, there is a perfect equilibrium that yields this outcome. (The strategies above constitute an imperfect equilibrium.) This note is devoted to the establishment of these facts.
One way to interpret this result is to see our two-stage game as a mechanism to generate Cournot-like outcomes that dispenses with the mythical auctioneer. In fact, an equivalent way of thinking about our game is as follows: Capacities are set in the first stage by the two producers. Demand is then determined by Bertrand-like price competition, and production takes place at zero cost, subject to capacity constraints generated by the first-stage decisions. It is easy to see that given capacities for the two producers, equilibrium behavior in the second, Bertrand-like, stage will not always lead to a price that exhausts capacity. But when those given capacities correspond to the Cournot output levels, in the second stage each firm names the Cournot price. And for the entire game, fixing capacities at the Cournot output levels is the unique equilibrium outcome. This yields a more satisfactory description of a game that generates Cournot outcomes. It is this language that we shall use subsequently.
This reinterpretation in terms of capacities suggests a variant of the game, in which both capacity creation (before price competition and realization of demand) and production (to demand) are costly. Our analysis easily generalizes to this case, and we state results for it at the end of this article.
Our intention in putting forward this example is not to give a model that accurately portrays any important duopoly. (We are both on record as contending that "reality" has more than one, and quite probably more than two, stages, and that multiperiod effects greatly change the outcomes of duopoly games.) Our intention instead is to emphasize that solutions to oligopoly games depend on both the strategic variables that firms are assumed to employ and on the context (game form) in which those variables are employed. The timing of decisions and information reception are as important as the nature of the decisions. It is witless to argue in the abstract whether Cournot or Bertrand was correct; this is an empirical question or one that is resolved only by looking at the details of the context within which the competitive interaction takes place.
Model formulation
* We consider two identical firms facing a two-stage competitive situation. These firms produce perfectly substitutable commodities for which the market demand function is given by P(x) (price as a function of quantity x) and D(p) = P`(p) (demand as a function of price p).
The two-stage competition runs as follows. At the first stage, the firms simultaneously and independently build capacity for subsequent production. Capacity level x means that up to x units can be produced subsequently at zero cost. The cost to firm i of (initially) installing capacity level xi is b(xi). After this first stage, each firm learns how much capacity its opponent installed. Then the firms simultaneously and independently name prices Pi chosen from the interval (The astute reader will notice that the analysis to follow does not require the full power of Assumptions 1 and 2. All that is really required is that, for each y < D(O), the functions x -xP(x + y) -b(x) and x -xP(x + y) are strictly quasi-concave (on (0, X -y)), and that rh and r appear as in Figure 1 . The former does require that p -pD(p) is strictly concave where it is positive, but this is not quite sufficient. In any event, we shall continue to proceed on the basis of the assumptions given, as they do simplify the arguments that follow.)
4. The capacity-constrained subgames * Suppose that in the first stage the firms install capacities xi and x2, respectively.
Beginning from the point where (xI, x2) becomes common knowledge, we have a proper subgame (using the terminology of Selten (1965)). We call this the (x,, x2) capacityconstrained subgame-it is simply the Edgeworth (1897) "constrained-capacity" variation on Bertrand competition. It is not a priori obvious that each capacity-constrained subgame has an equilibrium, as payoffs are discontinuous in actions. But it can be shown that the discontinuities are of the "right" kind. For subgames where x1 = x2, the existence of a subgame equilibrium is established by Levitan and Shubik (1972) in cases where demand is linear and marginal costs are constant. Also for the case of linear demand and constant marginal costs, Dasgupta and Maskin (1982) establish the existence of subgame equilibria for all pairs of x, and x2, and their methodology applies to all the cases that we consider. (We shall show how to "compute" the subgame equilibria below.)
The basic fact that we wish to establish is that for each (x , x2), the associated subgame has unique expected revenues in equilibrium. (It is very probably true that each subgame has a unique equilibrium, but we do not need this and shall not attempt to show it.) Moreover, we shall give formulas for these expected revenues. Proof By naming a price p less than P(xI + x2), firm i nets at most pxi. By naming P(x, + x2), firm i nets at worst P(xI + x2)(x, + x2 -x) = P(x1 + x2)xi.
Lemma 3. If P-1 = ft2 and each is named with positive probability, then pi =i = P(xI + x2) and xi < r(x1), for both i = 1 and i = 2.
Proof Suppose that p, = 12 and each is charged with positive probability. Without loss of generality, assume xi 2 x2, and suppose that p, = P2 > P(xI + X2). By naming a price slightly less than p,, firm 1 strictly improves its revenues over what it gets by naming p,.
(With positive probability, it sells strictly more, while the loss due to the lower price is small.) Thus 51 = 12 ' P(xI + X2). By Lemma 2, we know that Pi = Pi = P(xI + X2) for i= 1, 2. By naming a higher price p, firm i would obtain revenue (D(p) -x)p, or, letting x = D(p) -x>, xP(x + x>). This is maximized at x = r(x1), so that were r(xj) < xi, we would not have an equilibrium. Lemma 4. If xi < r(x1) for i = 1, 2, then a (subgame) equilibrium is for each firm to name P(x1 + x2) with probability one.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 3 shows that naming a price greater than P(x, + x2) will not profit either firm in this case. (Recall that xP(x + xj) is strictly concave.) And there is no incentive to name a lower price, as each firm is selling its full capacity at the equilibrium price.
Lemma 5. Suppose that either PfI > fi2, or that -l1 = fi2 and P-2 is not named with positive probability. Then: by the strict concavity of xP(x + x2). If the capacity constraint x, is binding (even weakly), then pI = P(x, + x2), and Lemma 2 implies that we are in the case of Lemma 3, thus contradicting the hypothesis of this lemma. Hence it must be the case that the constraint does not bind, or r(x2) < x, (which is (b)), p, = P(r(x2) + x2), and the equilibrium revenue of firm 1 is R(x2) (which is (a)). D(p) A xi) . Thus, we have an equilibrium only if D(pi) < xi and pi is the monopoly price. (By the strict concavity of xP(x), moving from pi in the direction of the monopoly price will increase revenue on the margin.) That is, pi = P(r(O)). But pi < pI = P(r(x2) + x2) < P(r(O)), which would be a contradiction. Thus Pi = P2. We denote this common value by p in the sequel. This is the first part of (c).
-For the second part of (c), note first that p > P(x, + x2). For if p = P(xI + x2), then by naming (close to) p, firm 1 would make at most P(xI + x2)x,. Since x, > r(x2) and the equilibrium revenue of firm 1 is R(x2), this is impossible.
Suppose that the firm with (weakly) less capacity named p with positive probability. Then the firm with higher capacity could, by naming a price slightly less than p, strictly increase its expected revenue. (It sells strictly more with positive probability, at a slightly lower price.) Thus, the firm with weakly less capacity names p with zero probability. Since p is the infimum of the support of the prices named by the lower capacity firm, this firm must therefore name prices arbitrarily close to and above p. But if its rival named p with positive probability, the smaller capacity firm would do better (since p > P(xI + x2)) to name a price just below p than it would to name a price just above p. Hence, neither firm can name p with positive probability.
For ( Suppose that x2> xI. Then D(p) > xl, and firm l's equilibrium revenue is pxl. We already know that it is also R(x2), so that we would have p = R(x2)/xI, and firm 2 nets R(x2)x2/xl. By naming price P(r(xl) + xl) (>pl -P(r(x2) + x2)), firm 2 will net R(xl). We shall have a contradiction, therefore, if we show that x, > r(x2) implies x,R(xl) > x2R(x2).
Let 0(x) = xR(x) = xr(x)P(r(x) + x). We have 0'(x) = r(x)P(r(x) + x) + xr'(x)P(r(x) + x) + xr(x)P'(r(x) + x)(r'(x) + 1) = (r(x) -x)P(r(x) + x) + x(r'(x) + 1)(P(r(x) + x) + r(x)P'(r(x) + x)).

The last term is zero by the definition of r(x), so that we have 0'(x) = (r(x) -x)P(r(x) + x).
Thus x2R(x2) -x,R(xl) = 0(x2) -0(xI) = fX2 (r(x) -x)P(r(x) + x)dx. The integrand
Xi is positive for x < x* and strictly negative for x > x*. We would like to show that the integral is negative, so that the worst case (in terms of our objective) is that in which x, < x* and x2 is as small as possible. Since x, > r(x2), for every x, < x* the worst case is where x2 is just a bit larger than r-'(xl). We shall thus have achieved our objective (of contradicting x2> xI, by showing that the integral above is strictly negative) if we show that for all x < x*, 0(x) -0(r-'(x)) 2 0.
But 0(x) -0(r-'(x)) = xr(x)P(x + r(x)) -r-'(x)xP(r-'(x) + x). This is nonnegative if and only if r(x)P(x + r(x)) -r-'(x)P(r-'(x) + x) 2 0, which is certainly true, since r(x)
is the best response to x. Lemma 6. If x, 2 X2 and x, > r(x2), there is a (mixed strategy) equilibrium for the subgame in which all the conditions and conclusions of Lemma 5 hold. Moreover, this equilibrium has the following properties. Each firm names prices according to continuous and strictly increasing distribution functions over an (coincident) interval, except that firm 1 names the uppermost price with positive probability whenever x, > x2. And if we let Ti(p) be the probability distribution function for the strategy of firm i, then P(P) ' T2(P): firm l's strategy stochastically dominates the strategy of firm 2, with strict inequality if x, > x2.
Remarks. The astute reader will note that the first sentence is actually a corollary to the previous lemmas and to the (as yet unproven) assertion that every subgame has an equilibrium. The actual construction of an equilibrium is unnecessary for our later analysis, and the casual reader may wish to omit it on first reading. It is, however, of sufficient independent interest to warrant presentation. In the course of this construction, we obtain the second part of the lemma, which is also noteworthy. At first glance, it might be thought that firm 1, having the larger capacity, would profit more by underselling its rival, and therefore it would name the (stochastically) lower prices. But (as is usual with equilibrium logic) this is backwards: Each firm randomizes in a way that keeps the other firm indifferent among its strategies. Because firm 1 has the larger capacity, firm 2 is more "at risk" in terms of being undersold, and thus firm 1 must be "less aggressive. Putting all these points together, we see that we have an equilibrium of the desired type if firm 1 names prices according to the distribution 'I, and firm 2 names them according to "'2. Each firm is (by construction) indifferent among those strategies that Proof. The proposition is established in four steps.
Step 1: preliminaries. Consider any equilibrium. As part of this equilibrium firm i chooses capacity according to some probability measure Ai with support Si C R. Let us denote by bi(x1, x2) the (possibly mixed) strategy used by firm i in the (xl, x2) subgame. Except for a ,A X , null subset of SI X 52, 4i(xI, X2) must be an optimal response to b,(x1, x2). That is, Qi = {(Xl, X2): 4i(XI, X2) is an optimal response to 41(xl, x2)} is such that (A1 X t2)(QIf nQ2) = 1. (For subgame perfect equilibria Qfl n Q2= R2, but we do not wish to restrict attention to such equilibria.) In particular, if E(xi) = {xj :(xI, X2) E Ql n Q2} and Xi = {xi E Si:Au(E(xi)) = 1}, then i,(X,i) = 1. Let 7ri denote the expected profit of firm i in this equilibrium and lri(xi) the expected profit when capacity xi is built. If Xi = {xi E Xi:7ri(xi) = 7ri}, then again ,Ai(Xi) = 1. Let x-i and xi denote the supremum and infimum of Xi. Because the subgame equilibrium revenue functions are continuous in xl and x2, and because revenues are bounded in any event, xl and xi must yield expected profit 7ri if firm j uses its equilibrium quantity strategy A,i and firms subsequently use subgame equilibrium price strategies.
Assume (without loss of generality) that xl X2.
Step 2: xl 2 rb(x2). Suppose contrariwise that xl < rb(x2). For every xl < xl, the subgame equilibrium revenue of firm 2, if it installs capacity x2, is x2P(xI + x2). That is, = f r ' (x2P(x_ + x?2) --I _,( \ If firm 2 increases its capacity slightly, to say, x2 + E, where it remains true that x, < rb(x2 + e), then the worst that can happen to firm 2 (for each level of xi) is that firm 2 will net (X2 + )P(xI + x2 + E)-b(-X2 + e). Since for all x, < -, x2 + e < rb(x1), it follows that (x2 + )P(xI + x2 + E) -bCX2 + E) > x2P(xI + x2)-b(x2), and this variation will raise firm 2's profits above 7r2. This is a contradiction.
Step 3: x1 < rb(x2). Suppose contrariwise that x, > rb(x2). By building x,, firm 1 nets revenue (as a function of x2) R(x2) ifxl > r(x2) and xIP(x, + x2) if xI< r(x2), assuming that a subgame equilibrium ensues. That is, 7r= (R (x2)-b(x-1) between (6) and (5) will be strictly positive. This is the desired contradiction.
Step 4. The rest is easy. Steps 2 and 3 imply that x, = rb(x2) = rb(x2), and hence that firm 2 uses a pure strategy in the first round. But then firm l's best response in the first round is the pure strategy rb(x2). And firm 2's strategy, which must be a best response to this, must satisfy x2 = rb(xl) = rb(rb(x2)). This implies that x2 = x*(b), and, therefore, xi = rb(x*(b)) = x*(b). Finally, the two firms will each name price P(2x*(b)) in the second round (as long as both firms produce x*(b) in the first round, which they will do with probability one); this follows immediately from Step 1 and Proposition 1. /D(p(x2) ). The numerator in the last expression is increasing for x2 < x* and is decreasing thereafter. (See the proof of Lemma 5.) And as p(x2) decreases in x2, the denominator increases in x2. Thus, the maximizing x2 is less than x*. But as long as firm 2 chooses capacity less than x*, the best revenue (in any subgame equilibrium) that firm 1 can hope to achieve is R(x2), which it achieves with any x, 2 D(0). Thus, we have a perfect subgame equilibrium in which firm 1 chooses xi > D(0) and firm 2 chooses x2 to maximize p(x2)x2.
6. When both capacity and production are costly * In a slightly more complicated version of this game, both capacity (which is installed before prices are named and demand is realized) and production (which takes place after demand is realized) would be costly. Assuming that each of these activities has a convex cost structure and that our assumptions on demand are met, it is easy to modify our analysis to show that the unique equilibrium outcome is the Cournot outcome computed by using the sum of the two cost functions. (This requires that capacity is costly on the margin. Otherwise, imperfect equilibria of all sorts and perfect equilibria of the sort given above will also appear.) It is notable that the cost of capacity need not be very high relative to production cost: the only requirement is that it be nonzero on the margin. Thus, situations where "most" of the cost is incurred subsequent to the realization of demand (situations that will "look" very Bertrand-like) will still give the Cournot outcome. (A reasonable conjecture, suggested to us by many colleagues, is that "noise" in the demand function will change this dramatically. Confirmation or rejection of this conjecture must await another paper.)
